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Abstract
Interest-rate spreads fluctuate widely across time and countries. We illustrate this on the
basis of about 3,100 quarterly observations for 21 advanced and 17 emerging economies since
the early 1990s. Prior to the financial crisis, spread fluctuations in advanced economies are an
order of magnitude smaller than in emerging economies. After 2008 their behavior has largely
converged along a number of dimensions. We also provide evidence on the transmission of spread
shocks and find it similar across sample periods and country groups. The importance of spread
shocks as a source of output fluctuations in advanced economies has increased after 2008.
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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis is having a lasting impact—on many economies but also on economics
as a science. The crisis gave rise to new ideas about what drives the business cycle and revived
old ones. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a major research effort during the last decade has been directed
towards appropriately capturing the role of financial frictions (for instance, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek
2012; Jermann and Quadrini 2012; Kaplan et al. 2018). Still, prior to the crisis, a specific type of
financial disturbance had already been well-established as an important source of the business cycle
in emerging market economies: interest-rate shocks (Neumeyer and Perri 2005; Uribe and Yue 2006).
According to this earlier research, interest-rate shocks and, in particular, shocks to the “country
spread” matter a great deal for emerging markets but are negligible in case of advanced economies.
This difference across country groups is plausible because, prior to the crisis, business cycles in
emerging markets have been considerable more volatile than in advanced economies (Aguiar and
Gopinath 2007).
In this paper, we ask whether country spreads still behave differently in emerging and advanced
economies. We answer this question as we explore a data set with a broad country coverage that
also includes a large number of observations for the period before and after the global financial
crisis. A first look at the data motivates the focus of our investigation. The (black) solid line in
Figure 1 shows the average country spread for 38 countries for the period since the early 1990s
until 2018Q4. Taken at face value, there is no dramatic change after 2008 as far as the level and
the volatility of this time series is concerned. However, the overall series masks large heterogeneity
in the underlying sample. For this reason, we also show in the same figure distinct time series for
the average spread in 17 emerging economies (red dotted line) and 21 advanced economies (blue
dashed line). We observe that prior to 2008, the average spread was very low and stable in advanced
economies and very high and volatile in emerging economies. After 2008, the average spread in
advanced and emerging economies behaves much more similar.
In the first part of the paper, we explain the construction of our data set and put forward a
number of stylized facts. Throughout, we build on and extend a unique data set originally assembled
in Born et al. (2020). It includes quarterly observations for the spread, output, as well as a number
of key macroeconomic and political indicators for 38 countries. In order to classify an economy as
“advanced” and “emerging” we follow IMF (2015). In total, there are more than 3,000 quarterly
observations in our sample. We document the variation of spreads across time and across countries
on the basis of these observations.
We find five facts particularly noteworthy. First, before 2008 the mean, the median, and the
standard deviation of the spread are at least 10 times higher in emerging economies than in advanced
economies. Second, after 2008 the mean and the median spread level in emerging economies are
now only twice as large as in advanced economies, due to both an increase in the average spread in
advanced economies and a decline in emerging economies compared to the pre-2008 period. The
volatility of the spread is basically the same across country groups after 2008. Third, consistent
with earlier research, we find that before 2008 the spread is counter-cyclical in emerging economies
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Figure 1: Average country spread for 38 countries (black solid line), 21 advanced economies (blue
dashed line), and 17 emerging economies (red dotted line). Country-group classification
based on IMF (2015). Data sources: see Section 2.1 below.
and pro-cyclical in advanced economies. After 2008 it is counter-cyclical for both country groups.
Fourth, the variation of spreads is not systematically related to the level of public debt, neither
before nor after 2008. Fifth, and last, we observe that while before 2008 the variation of spreads is
not systematically related to the exchange rate regime, after 2008 it is systematically higher the
less flexible the exchange rate regime is. We verify that these facts are insensitive to the particular
break date in 2008Q1. They also obtain once we split the sample in either 2007Q1 or 2009Q1.
These patterns raise interesting questions regarding causality. The country spread is certainly
endogenous to the fundamentals of a country—a point stressed by Uribe and Yue (2006) in light
of the analysis of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and a central theme in the literature on sovereign
default (e.g., Arellano 2008; Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). Yet, spreads also vary for reasons that
are exogenous to country-specific developments. One possibility is that global factors cause the
spread to vary such as, for instance, changes in risk aversion or the global financial cycle (Longstaff
et al. 2011; Rey 2013). This has been documented in particular in the context of emerging market
economies (Mauro et al. 2002). A second source of spread variations unrelated to fundamentals is
the possibility that spreads shift due to market sentiment or coordination failure as a result of which
changes in expectations may become self-fulfilling (e.g., Calvo 1988; Cole and Kehoe 2000; Lorenzoni
and Werning 2019). Either way, the notion of a “spread shock” is economically meaningful: these
are fluctuations of the spread that are exogenous to the fundamentals of the specific economy under
consideration.
In order to identify the dynamic effects of spread shocks, we rely on the causal model by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), recently popularized in macroeconomics (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2019;
Angrist and Kuersteiner 2011; Kuvshinov and Zimmermann 2019). In a nutshell, the idea is
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to measure the causal effect of a “treatment” by appropriately controlling for the fact that the
probability of treatment may be endogenous. For our application, we consider the possibility that
countries are treated with a large spread increase and define as treatment an increase of the spread
by more than one standard deviation and, at the same time, by at least 25 basis points. There are
230 such treatments in our sample. Because they involve large increases in the spread, they are
more likely to be caused by shifts in market sentiments or global factors. However, such treatments
may still be an endogenous, possibly non-linear, response to changes in fundamentals. To account
for “selection into treatment”, we follow Angrist et al. (2016) and estimate a logit model which
provides us with the propensity score, that is, the probability of a country to be treated, given its
fundamentals at a specific point in time. In a final step, we follow Jordà and Taylor (2016) and
employ the augmented inverse propensity score weighted (AIPW) estimator that uses the propensity
score to re-randomize observations in order to establish the causal effect of spread shocks. To shed
light on the transmission of spread shocks we consider the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on a
large set of outcome variables, both for emerging and advanced economies and for the period before
and after 2008.
Our main finding is that the transmission of a given spread shock is fairly similar in advanced
and emerging economies—both before and after 2008. The spread increases by about 40 basis
points in response to a “treatment”. Output and its components contract gradually over a two-year
period. The maximum effect on output is a contraction of about 0.3 percent. Importantly, the
adjustment takes place in an almost identical manner across country groups. The same holds,
minor differences notwithstanding, for fiscal policy. Government consumption, in particular, is
fairly unresponsive, while tax revenues decline, and the public deficit-to-GDP ratio rises somewhat.
Moreover, we find that the stock market contracts sharply, the real exchange rate depreciates, and
bank lending contracts again in both emerging and advanced economies. This result is consistent
with the notion that positive spread shocks result in capital outflows. We find that this effect is
considerably stronger in emerging economies—suggesting a higher vulnerability to international
capital flows in line with the received wisdom. Consistent with this interpretation, monetary policy
responds more aggressively in emerging economies. It raises short-term interest rates strongly. In
this regard, we do observe that advanced economies behave differently. There is not much of a
response by monetary policy, both before and after 2008. Our results are robust across a number
of specifications, including alternative break dates in 2007 or 2009 and a model with a larger
conditioning set of variables accounting for potential endogeneity of treatment. We also consider
a parsimonious model of the spread that identifies the effect of spread shocks (both positive and
negative) in the spirit of Uribe and Yue (2006). Using this approach we obtain results that are fairly
similar to the ATE in the baseline model.
A key finding of our analysis is that there is almost no change before and after 2008 as far
as the transmission mechanism is concerned. This suggests that the change in the unconditional
correlation pattern reflects a change in the incidence of shocks. We explore this issue by means of a
forecast error variance decomposition. For this purpose we split the sample once more into advanced
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and emerging economies and the sample period before and after 2008. Consistent with our earlier
findings, we find that, on average across horizons, spread shocks have become more important for
explaining output fluctuations in advanced economies since 2008. Before 2008 the contribution of
spread shocks in advanced economies amounted to 4 percent as opposed to 11 percent in emerging
economies. For the period after 2008, the corresponding values are 7 and 11 percent instead, with
the largest remaining difference occurring at very short horizons.
Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006) several studies have focused
on the role of interest rate shocks for the business cycle in emerging economies. Akinci (2013)
shows that country spreads are a key source of fluctuations in emerging economies and, in turn,
caused by global financial risk shocks. García-Cicco et al. (2010) perform a model-based analysis
and find that endogenous changes in country premiums are essential to account for business cycles
in emerging market economies. Further research has looked into the importance of interest-rate
uncertainty as source of business cycle fluctuation in emerging economies (Born and Pfeifer 2014;
Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2011). There is also model-based work that provides microfoundations
for interest-rate fluctuations (e.g. Brei and Buzaushina 2015; Fernández and Gulan 2015). Corsetti
et al. (2013) and Bocola (2016) put forward models where sovereign risk spills over to the private
sector, affecting financing condition adversely. Monacelli et al. (2018) investigate the effect of
interest rate shocks on productivity and document differences for emerging and advanced economies.
However, their data for advanced economies is limited to the period before 2008.
Furthermore, recent work by Faust et al. (2013), Gilchrist and Mojon (2018), and Gilchrist et al.
(2009) has highlighted the predictive role of credit spreads for real activity in advanced economies,
notably the US and selected countries of the euro area. In this case, aggregate spread measures are
constructed on the basis of individual bond spreads within countries, while our analysis is based on
the cross-country spread. Likewise, a recent contribution by Bocola and Dovis (2019) quantifies the
role of self-fulfilling expectations during the euro area crisis. Using an estimated structural model
they find that non-fundamental risk accounts for 13 percent of the variation in the Italian spread.
Lastly, recent work by Passari and Rey (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019) provides
evidence that spread fluctuations are caused by global financial conditions. Specifically, contrac-
tionary US monetary policy shocks are shown to impact global financial conditions and, as a result,
various spread measures increase around the globe. International lending contracts because of a
deleveraging by global financial intermediaries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details on our data set
and establishes basic facts about the country spread. What sets our analysis apart from earlier
work is both the scope of our data and our focus on the difference across country groups and sample
periods. Section 3 introduces the empirical strategy on which we rely to identify spread shocks and
their effects. It introduces our measure of treatment and provides a sense of how likely it is for
countries to be treated given their fundamentals. We show impulse responses to a spread shock in
Section 4, shedding light on the transmission mechanism. We also report the results of a forecast
error variance decomposition. A final section concludes.
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2 Stylized facts
Our analysis is based on quarterly observations for macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial market
variables. Most importantly, our dataset includes country spreads of interest rates. Our sample
covers 38 emerging and advanced economies and runs from the early 1990s up to the end of 2018.
We build on and extend the database assembled in earlier work (Born et al. 2020). In what
follows, we first explain briefly the construction of the country spread and characterize its behavior.
Afterwards, we provide a number of facts concerning the co-movement of the country spread and
the fundamentals of a country.
2.1 Country spreads
We follow Uribe and Yue (2006) and measure the country spread as the difference between foreign-
currency-denominated government or government-guaranteed bonds and risk-free bonds in the same
currency. As a result, changes in the spread reflect changes in default risk and/or risk aversion (rather
than expectations about inflation and/or expected currency depreciation). As the construction of
the spread is mostly based on liquid securities with comparable maturities, it is also unlikely to be
driven by liquidity or term premia. We exclude default episodes from our sample.1 Throughout our
analysis, we focus on the spread rather than the level of the (real) interest rate, because we are
interested in differential developments across advanced and emerging economies—as opposed to
movements in the underlying risk-free interest rate that is common to both country groups.
As stressed by Neumeyer and Perri (2005), interest rates on government debt are not identical
to those of the private sector, but there is generally a very strong co-movement. Like Uribe and
Yue (2006), we rely on the JPMorgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) data set, but also
on a number of additional sources, as explained in detail in earlier work (Born et al. 2020). In
what follows, we pursue the same approach as in Born et al. (2020), but update the data to include
observations up to 2018Q4. In total, there are 1728 country-quarter observations for advanced
economies and 1433 for emerging economies. Table A.4 in the appendix provides details on the
sample coverage and descriptive statistics at the country level.
In what follows, we compute a number of statistics, both for the period before and after 2008.
Specifically, the first sample period ends in 2007Q4, the second starts in 2008Q1, that is, it includes
the year 2008. We verify that our results are qualitatively unaffected when we use 2007Q1 or 2009Q1
as alternative break dates.
In Table 1 we report a number of summary statistics for the spread in advanced and emerging
economies. The statistics in the left panel refer to the level of the spread measured in percentage
points, while the right panel refers to the quarterly change of the spread measured in basis points.
A number of observations stand out. First, before 2008 advanced and emerging economies exhibited
very different average levels of the spread. In this case, both the mean and the median are more
1 Default episodes are: Greece (2012Q1-2012Q2, 2012Q4), Argentina (2001Q4-2005Q2, 2014Q3-2016Q2), Ecuador
(1999Q3-2000Q3, 2008Q4-2009Q2), Uruguay (2003Q2) and Peru (2000Q3). This classification follows Standard &
Poor’s (see Witte et al. 2018, Table 13).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the country spread before and after 2008Q1
Before 2008 After 2008 Before 2008 After 2008
Adv. Em. Adv. Em. Adv. Em. Adv. Em.
Spread level sit (percentage points) Spread change ∆sit (basis points)
Mean 0.33 4.25 1.50 3.09 −0.24 −3.45 2.72 2.71
Median 0.25 2.84 0.70 2.39 −0.30 −7.38 −0.95 −4.88
Std. Dev. 0.32 3.94 2.22 2.29 12.77 160.07 69.49 98.87
Min −0.14 0.15 −0.06 0.41 −99.08 −952.59 −314.45 −854.70
Max 2.20 24.22 24.56 19.50 97.50 1 039.00 783.21 795.84
Kurtosis 10.95 6.42 26.61 11.56 20.43 12.86 29.87 20.76
Skewness 2.34 1.74 3.93 2.46 0.10 1.13 2.66 0.91
Observations 870 719 888 737 843 698 885 735
Notes: Level of spread measured in percentage points (left panel) and quarterly change in basis points (right
panel).
than 10 times higher in emerging economies than in advanced economies. Likewise, the standard
deviation is about 10 times higher. However, before 2008, as the mean spread change in column
6 shows, emerging market spreads were on average on a downward trajectory. Second, for the
period after 2008 we find that the spread behaves much more similar in the two country groups.
The mean and median spread level in emerging economies are now only bigger by a factor of 2,
due to both an increase in the average spread in advanced economies and a decrease in emerging
economies compared to the previous period. For the spread level, we can reject the hypothesis that
the mean is the same across country groups before and after 2008, on the basis of both a parametric
two-sample t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U test. For the spread change, only the
Mann-Whitney-U test rejects the null.2 After 2008, the standard deviation and the maximum
realization have largely converged to a level previously only reached by emerging economies. The
same holds true for average spread changes and their standard deviation. We can reject the null of
equal standard deviations for the spread level before 2008, but not after 2008 (p=0.3413). However,
for the spread change we can reject the null of equal standard deviations for both sample periods.
Importantly, these changes are not driven by individual countries, but are rather broad-based, as
an inspection of Table A.4 and A.5 in the appendix makes clear. For instance, in the advanced
economy group, the standard deviation of the spread increased after 2008 not only by a factor 9
in Greece but also in Germany. Similarly, the maximum spread changes increased considerably in
all advanced economies. We obtain very similar results if we consider alternative break dates in
2007Q1 or 2009Q1, see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix.
As a way to visualize the change in the spread distribution over time, we show kernel density
estimates in Figure 2. Here, the top panels show the distribution of the spread measured in levels,
the bottom panels show the distribution of the quarterly change. We once more contrast data for
2The t-test with its clearly violated assumption of normality cannot reject the null of equal means for both sample
periods. This is unsurprising given the large underlying standard deviations.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the spread in levels (top) and in changes (bottom) before 2008 (left)
and after 2008 (right). Kernel density estimate for advanced economies (blue solid line)
and emerging economies (red dashed line); spread level measured in percentage points,
change of spread in basis points. The kernel density estimate employs an Epanechnikov
kernel with bandwidth 8 for the spread change and 0.15/0.25 (before/after 2008) for the
spread level.
the period before and after 2008, shown in the left and right column, respectively. In each panel,
the solid line displays the distribution for advanced economies and the dashed line represents the
distribution for emerging economies. We again note that the two country groups are very different
before 2008 and much more similar in terms of their distribution after 2008. Before 2008, the mass
of the observations for advanced economy spreads is close to zero, both in terms of the level and the
change. This changes considerably after 2008: the distribution becomes wider and less concentrated
around zero—a feature formerly characterizing the distribution for emerging economies. Turning to
higher moments, we find the distribution to be right-skewed for all time periods, country groups,
and both spread measures. Given that spreads are bounded from below, this is unsurprising. But
it is noteworthy that the skewness has increased after 2008 and more so for advanced economies
(see also Table 1). We also find the distribution of spread changes to be leptokurtic, that is, the
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Figure 3: Cross-correlation functions for output yt and spread st+k, measured in levels at lead/lag
k = 0, . . . ,±4 before 2008 (left panel) and after 2008. The blue solid line depicts the
average correlation for advanced economies, the red dashed line for emerging economies.
Shaded areas indicates 25% and 75% interquartile range in the respective country group.
Output is HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
mass of observed changes is clustered around 0 with more extreme observations in both tails of the
distribution (compared to a Gaussian distribution with the same first two moments). While positive
excess kurtosis (that is >3) is pervasive for both country groups in both sample periods, it is larger
to begin with and also increased more for advanced economies (see also Table 1).
2.2 Country spreads and fundamentals: co-movement
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) highlight a striking pattern regarding the cyclicality of interest rates. On
the basis of data for the period up to the early 2000s for five emerging and five advanced economies,
they show that the contemporaneous co-movement of output and real interest rates at business cycle
frequencies is negative for emerging economies, but positive for advanced economies. Fernández and
Gulan (2015) report similar results when considering data up to 2010Q3. We revisit these findings
on the basis of our data set, which includes more countries and more recent observations after the
global financial crisis. Figure 3 displays the cross-correlation between the cyclical component of
output and the spread.
Again, we show results for the period before 2008 in the left panel and results for the period
after 2008 in the right panel. For the period before 2008 (left panel), we obtain the same pattern
as Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Fernández and Gulan (2015) for output and real interest rates.
In particular, for emerging economies the contemporaneous correlation is counter-cyclical. The
correlation becomes stronger (weaker) for further leads (lags). Instead, in advanced economies the
contemporaneous correlation is slightly positive, that is, the spread is mildly pro-cyclical. This
pattern only changes after 2008, when the contemporaneous correlation turns counter-cyclical for
advanced economies as well. As the right panel of the figure shows, the cross-correlation function
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Table 2: Unconditional relationship between output and spread
Advanced economies Emerging economies
Before 2008 After 2008 Before 2008 After 2008
σ(Y ) ρ(Y, s) σ(Y ) ρ(Y, s) σ(Y ) ρ(Y, s) σ(Y ) ρ(Y, s)
Australia 1.31 −0.06 0.49 −0.30 Argentina 3.14 −0.42 3.32 −0.26
Austria 1.00 0.27 1.29 −0.07 Brazil 1.05 −0.10 2.00 −0.55
Belgium 0.99 −0.11 0.93 0.02 Bulgaria 2.00 0.90 1.40 0.37
Czech Republic 1.68 −0.04 1.75 −0.13 Chile 1.75 −0.37 1.77 0.00
Denmark 1.36 −0.08 1.32 −0.20 Colombia 1.40 −0.28 1.16 −0.01
Finland 1.99 −0.37 2.18 −0.07 Croatia 1.59 −0.34 1.96 −0.41
France 0.93 0.35 0.93 −0.02 Ecuador 1.70 −0.41 1.95 −0.38
Germany 1.21 0.07 1.64 −0.18 El Salvador 1.12 −0.62 1.14 −0.01
Greece 1.30 0.04 2.46 −0.75 Hungary 1.23 0.03 1.67 −0.42
Ireland 2.38 −0.07 4.11 −0.22 Malaysia 1.45 −0.28 1.66 −0.40
Italy 1.05 0.03 1.42 0.04 Mexico 2.47 −0.39 1.70 −0.22
Latvia 4.05 0.54 4.44 −0.28 Peru 1.62 −0.12 1.41 0.13
Lithuania 3.03 0.56 4.11 −0.34 Poland 1.41 −0.06 1.02 0.19
Netherlands 1.30 0.64 1.22 −0.11 South Africa 1.60 −0.43 1.13 0.21
Portugal 1.04 0.63 1.55 −0.13 Thailand 3.20 −0.81 2.13 −0.43
Slovakia 2.34 −0.04 2.07 −0.21 Turkey 3.57 −0.57 3.44 −0.20
Slovenia 1.60 0.14 2.30 −0.40 Uruguay 3.71 −0.88 1.23 −0.13
Spain 0.96 0.11 1.49 −0.46
Sweden 1.30 0.04 1.80 −0.48
United Kingdom 1.27 0.03 1.26 −0.69
United States 1.34 1.05 −0.58
Total 1.63 0.01 2.17 −0.17 Total 2.22 −0.20 1.86 −0.10
Notes: Standard deviation of log output Y and contemporaneous correlation with the spread level s in
advanced and emerging economies before 2008 and after 2008. GDP is measured in percentage deviation from
HP-trend. In the last line we report the equally-weighted country average.
now exhibits a similar S-shaped pattern for both emerging and advanced economies. We again
obtain very similar results if we consider alternative break dates, see Figures A.1 and A.2 in the
appendix.
In Table 2, we report more details on a country-by-country basis. For each advanced economy
(left panel) we report standard deviations of output deviations from its trend and the spread (in
levels) for the period before and after 2008. The same statistics are reported for each emerging
economy in our sample (right panel). The table shows that the convergence of the correlation
pattern in advanced economies to that formerly only found in emerging economies is not driven
by specific countries: the contemporaneous correlation of output and the spread declined in all
advanced economies, except for Belgium, Finland, and Italy.
Next, we turn to the co-movement between the spread and the debt-to-GDP ratio shown in
Figure 4. As before, the left and right panels display data for the periods before and after 2008,
respectively. The top row refers to the level of the spread, the bottom row to the change. Blue
plus signs indicate observations for advanced economies, while red circles refer to observations for
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Figure 4: Spread and debt-to-GDP ratio. Top: spread measured in levels (percentage points).
Bottom: quarterly spread changes (in percentage points). Blue plus signs indicate
observations for advanced economies and red circles indicate observations for emerging
economies. Public debt-to-GDP ratio refers to general or central government (external)
debt relative to GDP/GNI.
emerging economies. For the period before 2008, depicted in the left panels, we observe distinct
patterns for emerging and advanced economies. The debt-to-GDP ratio varies considerably in both
country groups, from 7 to 135 percent in advanced economies and from 17 to 111 percent in emerging
economies. Yet, even though the range of the debt-to-GDP ratio observed in both country groups
is similar, the spread in levels (top left panel) seems to be positively associated with the level of
debt in emerging economies, but not much in advanced economies. Again, we observe a notable
change for the period after 2008 (top right panel): debt-to-GDP ratios in advanced economies
now reach considerably higher levels (of up to 182 percent). The opposite holds true for emerging
economies, where the largest observation now only reaches 85 percent of GDP. Moreover, after 2008,
the spread in levels exhibits a positive comovement with debt in advanced economies as well. For
spread changes (bottom panels) we observe that they differ systematically across country groups,
but hardly with the level of debt. After 2008, the range of spread changes appears still largely
unrelated to the level of debt.
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Figure 5: Spread change versus exchange rate classification before 2008 (left panel) and after
2008 (right panel). Blue plus signs indicate observations for advanced economies and
red circles indicate observations for emerging economies. The exchange rate regime
classification follows the coarse classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2019): 1 denotes peg,
2 crawling peg, 3 managed float, 4 freely floating, 5 freely falling, and 6 denotes dual
market. After 2008, there are no observations of categories 5 and 6 in our sample.
Finally, we investigate how spread changes vary across exchange rate regimes. For this purpose,
we rely on the coarse regime classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2019). It allows for six categories, which
feature increasingly flexible exchange rate regimes: an exchange rate peg (1), a crawling peg (2), a
managed float (3), a freely floating exchange rate (4), a freely falling exchange rate (5), and a dual
market (6). We order these categories from left to right on the horizontal axis in Figure 5, again for
the period before 2008 (left panel) and after 2008 (right panel). We measure the quarterly change
in the spread along the vertical axis and use red circles for observations for emerging economies
and blue plus signs for advanced economies. Again, we observe that the basic patterns in the
data change across the two sample periods. Prior to 2008 there is no apparent systematic relation
between spread changes and exchange rate regimes. While spreads generally vary little for advanced
economies, the variation in spread changes does not differ much across exchange rate regimes in
emerging economies. In contrast, after 2008 variation in spread changes is systematically higher,
the less flexible the exchange rate regime. This finding is consistent with the notion that some of
the variation in spreads is due to self-fulfilling expectations which, in theory, are more likely to
take place if monetary policy is lacking autonomy (Bianchi and Mondragon 2018; De Grauwe 2012;
Lorenzoni and Werning 2019).3 The notion that spreads vary for reasons unrelated to fundamentals,
for instance, because expectations become self-fulfilling, provides the rationale for the strategy that
we use to identify exogenous variation in the spread. We take up this issue in the next section.
3This effect should be less important in case of foreign currency debt. However, even in this case self-fulling runs
may be more likely the less flexible the exchange rate regime. For if monetary policy is able to act as a lender of last
resort for domestic debt, this may free up resources to satisfy the claims of foreign-currency debt holders.
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3 Measuring the effects of spread shocks
In the remainder of the paper we focus on spread shocks and how they impact both emerging and
advanced economies before and after 2008. As argued in the introduction, there are strong reasons
to expect that the country spread fluctuates partly for reasons which are exogenous, either because
of global developments or shifts in market sentiment. Our identification strategy is based on the
causal model by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), which permits estimation of a “treatment effect”. In
the context of our analysis a treatment boils down to being exposed to a large spread increase, as
we explain in some detail in what follows. In Section 3.2 we present a measure of how likely it is for
a country to be treated at a particular point in time, that is, its propensity score. In Section 3.3 we
explain how we rely on the propensity score as we employ an augmented inverse propensity score
weighted (AIPW) estimator in order to establish the causal effect of sovereign spread shocks. Last,
we also discuss an alternative strategy to measure spread shocks.
3.1 Treatment
In our baseline, we focus on large increases of the spread in order to capture events that are
potentially more disruptive than garden-variety changes of the spread. Moreover, large changes are
also more likely to be caused by exogenous factors, to the extent that country-specific fundamentals
change only gradually. Still, large changes of the spread may also reflect an endogenous response to
fundamentals. We account for this possibility once we control for selection into treatment on the
basis of a large set of fundamentals as well as for potentially non-linear selection effects. In our
baseline, we consider only spread increases rather than spread changes, because their effect is not
necessarily symmetric. In our robustness analysis we pursue an alternative approach for which we
no longer restrict our analysis to spread increases. Instead, we consider both positive and negative
spread shocks.
To operationalize the notion of a treatment with a large spread increase, we define a dummy
variable that assumes a value of one whenever the change of the spread for a given country-quarter
observation is larger than one standard deviation and, in addition, at least 25 basis points. Otherwise,
the dummy is zero:
Di,t = 1(∆si,t >= σi ∧∆si,t >= 25bp) . (1)
Here and in what follows the subscripts t and i refer to the quarter and the country of an observation,
respectively. ∆si,t is the change in the spread, as measured at the end of a quarter, and σi is the
country-specific standard deviation of spread changes.4
On the basis of this definition, 229 observations in our sample qualify as treatments. This
amounts to 7.25 percent of the observed spread changes.5 Table A.6 in the appendix reports the
4Mauro et al. (2002), in their emerging market economy analysis, consider a spread increase large if it exceeds two
standard deviations.
5This is well below the 16 percent of observations we would expect outside of the one-sigma interval of a normal
distribution. The reason is that spread changes are not normally distributed (see Table 1) and because we require a
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Figure 6: Spread deviations from country-mean around treatments, before (left) and after 2008
(right) in advanced (solid line) and emerging economies (dashed line). Country-specific
spread movements around treatments are measured as the average of spread deviations
from the respective country mean over all events in the country in the event window
t ± h. Lines indicate the median of country-specific spread movements, shaded areas
indicate the 25% and 75% interquartile range across countries. Time is measured in
quarters. For definition of treatment, see main text, equation (1).
maximum spread change along with the number of treatments for each country in the sample.6
Table A.7 in the appendix lists all the countries which have been treated in a specific quarter. We
find that treatments are fairly evenly distributed across time and countries. In 49 out of 156 quarters
there is at least one treatment. Each country in our sample has been treated at least once. Still,
perhaps unsurprisingly, treatments also bunch in quarters associated with major crises: 1998Q3,
2008Q3, 2008Q4, 2010Q2, and 2011Q3. For all countries in our sample we find that the spread
increases by more than one standard deviation at the time of the treatment, suggesting that we
indeed capture episodes of exceptionally large spread increases.
Figure 6 illustrates how spreads evolve in an event window centered around the quarter in which
a treatment takes place. To account for the fact that the level of the spread differs across countries,
we first express the country-specific spread in terms of deviations from the country mean. We then
compute the country-mean of these spread deviations over all events in the respective country. The
left panel represents data for the period before 2008, the right panel for the period after 2008. The
solid line represents the median over the individual mean-country-spreads for advanced economies
around treatments. The dashed line represents the median for emerging economies. The shaded
area represents the 25%-75% interquartile range across countries. The horizontal axis captures four
quarters before to four quarters after treatment.
In the period before 2008, the median spread movement around treatments amounts to a
treatment to raise the spread by at least 25 basis points. When dropping the latter requirement, 8.16 percent of the
observations qualify as treatments.
6Recall that we exclude country-quarter observations for which countries are in default.
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4 percentage point increase above the country average in emerging economies. At the same time,
the average spread movement around treatments is fairly moderate in advanced economies, namely
0.15 percentage points above the country average and 36 basis points relative to the pre-treatment
period. In advanced economies, the spread is flat in the year preceding the event, while it is already
elevated in the quarter before the treatment in emerging economies. After treatment takes place, the
spread remains high for an extended period only in emerging economies. For the period after 2008
a different picture emerges. The spread movement around treatments in advanced and emerging
economies is now of about the same size. For emerging economies we observe a somewhat sharper
rise of the spread at the time of the treatment. For advanced economies the spread is already
elevated prior to treatment and persistently high afterwards. By and large, however, we find once
more that the dynamics in advanced and emerging economies have become fairly well aligned after
2008. In the appendix, we display event windows on a country-by-country basis, see Figures A.3
and A.4.
3.2 Selection into treatment
The selection into treatment is not random, but likely to depend on fundamentals. In order to
quantify how the probability of treatment varies with fundamentals, we run a logistic regression.
Formally, a country’s likelihood of receiving a treatment at a given point in time, Di,t, conditional
on some observable fundamentals Xi,t, that is, its propensity score, is given by
p(Di,t = 1|Xi,t) = G(Xi,tβ) , (2)
where G is a logistic cumulative density function and β denotes a vector of regression coefficients.
A low propensity score p indicates that, based on the fundamentals Xi,t, experiencing a treatment
is unlikely. As a consequence, the treatment is likely to be caused by exogenous factors. The vector
Xi,t in our model contains a large number of contemporaneous and lagged control variables, dummy
variables, and country-fixed effects.7
Note that it is generally recommended to “over-model” the propensity score, that is, to include a
large number of covariates because this ensures that the conditional independence assumption (CIA)
(see below) is indeed satisfied. In our baseline model, Xi,t features key macroeconomic variables
such as GDP growth, public debt, and inflation, as well as a number of indicators that capture
the political stability of a country (see Table A.1 in the appendix for details). For a subset of
country-quarter observations there are additional control variables available, namely the term spread,
the short-term interest rate, and a measure of credit, as well as forecasts of GDP and government
spending growth. Whenever we rely on the larger set of control variables we refer to the “extended
model” as opposed to the “baseline model”. Given the limited availability of control variables, we
estimate the logit model (2) on 161 treatments in case of the baseline model and 76 treatments in
case of the extended model.
7We do not allow for time-fixed effects because we do not want to eliminate spread variation that is likely due to
global economic developments and, hence, exogenous to country-specific developments.
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Figure 7: Propensity score and spread change before 2008 (left panel) and after 2008 (right panel)
for treatment events Di,t = 1. Blue plus signs (red circles) indicate observations for
advanced (emerging) economies.
Figure 7 correlates the estimated propensity score with the change in the spread for the
observations in our baseline sample for which a treatment has taken place according to definition
(1).8 As before, we use red circles to refer to observations for emerging market economies and blue
crosses for advanced economies. The left panel refers again to the period before 2008, while the right
panel refers to the period after 2008. First, we note that there are very few treatments for advanced
economies before 2008. Second, in the period before 2008 there are many treatments of emerging
economies for which the propensity score is moderate. This suggests that the treatment cannot be
well explained by fundamentals. Instead, it is likely caused by exogenous factors. Third, the same
holds for the period after 2008, although in this case both for emerging and advanced economies.
Before we move on to estimating treatment effects, we formally assess the goodness-of-fit of
our model. To this end, we follow Jordà and Taylor (2016) and report the Area Under the Curve
(AUC)-statistic.9 For the baseline (extended) model, we obtain a value of 0.8730 (0.9457) with a
standard error of 0.0139 (0.0155). This suggests that both models are doing a good job in predicting
treatments. The resulting propensity score allows us to control for selection into treatment as we
estimate the ATE below. In addition, we check whether the so-called overlap condition is satisfied in
the context of our analysis. It ensures that we can compute the treatment effect for all realizations
of the control variables in our sample (see e.g. Imbens 2004; Wooldridge 2010).10 We find that the
8Table A.8 in the appendix reports the point estimates as well as the implied average marginal effects, while Tables
A.9 and A.10 report the means and standard deviations of the estimated propensity scores pˆ on a country-by-country
basis.
9The AUC statistic summarizes the predictive ability of the estimation model to classify the observations correctly
into treatment and control group. The AUC can take values between 0.5 (no predictive power) up to 1 (full accuracy).
Its estimator is asymptotically normally distributed. See Jordà and Taylor (2011) and Hanley and McNeil (1982) for
details.
10Formally, the overlap assumption is defined as 0 < p(Di,t = 1|Xi,t) < 1. Intuitively, for every observation with
characteristic vector Xi,t, we require a strictly positive probability of being in the treatment group as well as in the
control group. Otherwise, we would be trying to compare observational units that are “incomparable”.
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distributions of the estimated propensity scores indeed show considerably overlap, see Figure A.5 in
the appendix.
3.3 Estimating the treatment effect
In order to establish the causal effect of a treatment we have to account for the fact that the spread
itself responds to the fundamentals of a country, that is, to macroeconomic and political factors in
the economy. To address this issue, we follow Jordà and Taylor (2016) and employ the augmented
inverse propensity score weighted (AIPW) estimator. Intuitively, we construct a matching-type
estimator that compares a control and a treatment group. To deal with non-random allocation into
the respective groups, the propensity score is used to re-randomize the observations. Observations
with characteristics Xi,t causing a high propensity score are more likely to be in the treatment group
and are therefore weighted down. At the same time, observations with a low propensity score—for
which the treatment is more likely to be exogenous—tend to be undersampled and receive more
weight in the estimator.
We introduce some notation to fix ideas. Generally, in order to establish the causal effects
of a treatment Di,t = d, d ∈ {0, 1}, defined as in equation (1) above, we rely on the conditional
independence assumption (CIA) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983):11
Yi,t+h(d)− Yi,t ⊥ Di,t | Xi,t for h > 0 , (3)
where Yi,t+h(d) − Yi,t denotes the potential outcome of variable Y at time t + h relative to its
baseline value. This baseline value is observed at time t and we assume it not to be affected by the
treatment.12 An exception is the spread for which we study the response to the treatment relative
to its value in the pre-treatment period t− 1. The vector Xi,t contains control variables as described
in Section 3.2. Intuitively, equation (3) states that, conditional on the controls, the allocation of
observational units to the control and treatment group, respectively, is independent of potential
outcomes. We estimate the treatment effect for each variable of interest in quarters h = 1, . . . , 8
after treatment.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the overlap condition is satisfied and the CIA holds,
then the latter will also hold if one conditions only on the propensity score:
Yi,t+h(d)− Yi,t ⊥ Di,t | p(Di,t = 1|Xi,t) for h > 0 . (4)
Intuitively, instead of effectively matching units in the treatment and control groups that are similar
along all dimensions of the covariates Xi,t, it is sufficient if they have a similar propensity score.
As discussed in the previous subsection, we find that condition (4) is satisfied in the context of
our analysis. Hence, we simply use the propensity score as estimated above to compute the AIPW
estimator, which provides us with the average causal effect of an exogenous increase in the spread
11See Lunceford and Davidian (2004) and Wooldridge (2010) for a discussion.
12Note that as we estimate the propensity score, we permit a contemporaneous effect of the control variables on
the spread.
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on our outcome variables of interest.
Specifically, we employ an AIPW estimator with regression adjustment, which is the most
efficient one in its class of so-called doubly-robust estimators (Lunceford and Davidian 2004).13
Formally, we use
ATEhAIPW =
1
N
N∑
t=1
{[
Dt(Yt+h − Yt)
pˆt
− (1−Dt)(Yt+h − Yt)(1− pˆt)
]
− Dt − pˆt
pˆt(1− pˆt)
[
(1− pˆt)mh1(X) + pˆtmh0(X)
]}
, (5)
where treatment takes place at time t and the effect on the dependent variable is captured at horizon
t+ h. In the expression above, we drop the panel index i to ease notation.
Two things are noteworthy about this estimator. First, by including propensity-score weights pˆt
and (1− pˆt) in the denominator in the first line of Equation (5) we achieve a random allocation
of observational units into treatment and control group. Second, the second line of Equation (5)
features a regression adjustment component, which among other things stabilizes the estimator in
case the propensity score gets close to zero or one (see Lunceford and Davidian 2004).14 This is an
issue of some concern in light of the estimated propensity scores reported in Tables A.9 and A.10.15
For inference, we use the asymptotic normality of the AIPW estimator and rely on an empirical
sandwich estimator of the variance, as explained in Lunceford and Davidian (2004), to compute
clustered robust standard errors.
3.4 An alternative approach
Our baseline approach focuses on specific treatments—defined as a large increase of the spread. As
argued in Section 3.1 above, in this way we are more likely to capture events that are a) particularly
disruptive and b) not caused by country fundamentals. In order to assess the robustness of our
results, we purse an alternative strategy in the spirit of Uribe and Yue (2006), who identify spread
shocks using a VAR-style recursive scheme with the spread ordered last.16 Given this identifying
assumption, the relevant regression equation for the spread change (analogous to the definition of
treatment) is given by:
∆si,t = ηi +Xi,tβ + εi,t , (6)
where the column vector of controls Xi,t contains current and one-period lagged values of GDP
growth and net exports as well as the lag of the spread. εi,t are mean zero structural innovations,
13In this class, consistent estimation of the ATE is achieved as long as either the model for the conditional mean or
the propensity score model are correctly specified.
14The terms mhd(X), d ∈ {0, 1} are the conditional means derived from the conditional mean model. This is a
regression of (Yt+h − Yt) on the covariates Xt, conditional on the subsample of treatment (d = 1) or control (d = 0).
15An alternative to including a regression adjustment term is truncation. We find that our results are fairly robust
as we consider a truncated propensity score at ±5%, ±10%, and ±20%.
16Technically, they estimate a panel VAR equation by equation and include the US interest rate and the country
interest rate separately. But, as they argue, this is equivalent to including the spread directly.
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Figure 8: Spread shocks (vertical axis), as captured by linear model (6), measured against change
in spread in percentage points (horizontal axis) before and after 2008. Blue plus signs
(red circles) indicate observations for advanced (emerging) economies.
that is “spread shocks”, and ηi are country-fixed effects.17 In terms of identification, model (6)
just like our baseline, allows for a contemporaneous effect of fundamentals on the spread change,
but rules out that fundamentals respond immediately to spread changes. However, following Uribe
and Yue (2006), model (6) is much more parsimonious than our baseline model for two reasons.
First, with OLS regressions, “over-modeling” as in the case of propensity score estimation is not
advocated. Second, because the model features fewer explanatory variables, we can estimate the
OLS regressions separately for the groups of advanced and emerging economies before and after
2008.
In Figure 8 we correlate spread shocks, that is, the residuals from regression (6), εˆi,t, and the
change in the spread. As before red circles refer to observations for emerging economies, while blue
plus signs refer to observations for advanced economies, the left panel shows results for the period
before 2008, the right panel for the period after 2008. For the period before 2008 we again observe
a different distribution between advanced and emerging economies. Shocks are small in the former
and quite sizeable in the latter. After 2008, the shocks have again become much more comparable
in terms of size across the two country groups. This suggests that there is considerable exogenous
variation in the spread.
We use the residuals of regression (6) as a measure of the spread shock and estimate its dynamic
effect on various outcome variables via local projections (Jordà 2005). Letting Yi,t+h denote the
variable of interest in period t+ h, we regress it on spread shocks in period t on the basis of the
following specification:
Yi,t+h − Yi,t = αi,h + ψhεˆi,t + ui,t+h , (7)
17The R2 of these OLS regressions (for various sample splits) ranges between 0.78 and 0.90, which indicates that
around 10 to 20 percent of the variation in the spread is left unexplained by the model and hence can be attributed to
non-fundamental shocks. This finding is in line with the decomposition of Bocola and Dovis (2019).
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where Yi,t again denotes the unshocked baseline value of variable Y . In equation (7), the coefficients
ψh, which we estimate by OLS, provide a direct estimate of the impulse response at horizon h to a
spread shock.18 The error term ui,t+h is assumed to have zero mean and strictly positive variance.
αi,h denotes country-fixed effects. We compute clustered robust standard errors.
The local projection framework also allows us to compute the contribution of the spread shocks
to the forecast error variance of our variables of interest. Following Gorodnichenko and Lee
(forthcoming), we compute the variance share of the shock at horizon h as the R2 of the following
regression
uˆi,t+h = γ0εˆi,t+h + . . .+ γhεˆi,t + νi,t+h , (8)
where uˆi,t+h is the forecast error of the local projection (7) at horizon h and νi,t+h is a mean 0
disturbance.
4 Results
We first shed some light on how spread shocks are transmitting through the economy, as we study
the dynamic adjustment to spread shocks by means of impulse response functions. Second, we
establish that our results are robust across a number of alternative specifications. Lastly, we report
the contribution of spread shocks to output fluctuation on the basis of a forecast error variance
decomposition. Throughout, we are interested in possible differences across country groups and
sample periods.
4.1 Shock transmission
We now show the impulse responses to a spread shock. First, we report results for the AIPW
estimator in equation (5) with the treatment defined in equation (1). In Figure 9, the (blue) solid and
(red) dashed lines represent the point estimates for advanced and emerging economies, respectively.
In each instance, the shaded area indicates the 90 percent confidence interval based on clustered
robust standard errors. We measure time in quarters along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis
measures the deviation relative to the pre-shock level in either percent or basis points. As before,
the left column shows results for the period before 2008, the right column for the period after 2008.
Our main finding is that the dynamic adjustment to a spread shock does not differ much across
country groups or sample periods. We find this result particularly noteworthy in light of the facts
established in Section 2 above. As shown in the top row, spreads remain elevated for an extended
period of about four quarters. The initial increase is about 50 basis points. After three quarters,
spreads are still some 20 basis points higher than prior to treatment. This pattern is remarkably
similar across countries, both for the period before and after 2008.
18The shock is thus a generated regressor in the second stage (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015). Still, Pagan
(1984) shows that the standard errors obtained after a regression on the shocks are asymptotically valid under the null
that the coefficient is 0.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of the spread and real national accounts variables to a h = 0 sovereign spread shock
based on the ATE estimator in equation (5) together with the treatment definition in (1). Solid (blue)
and dashed (red) line represents deviation from pre-shock treatment level for advanced and emerging
economies, respectively. Shaded areas correspond to 90% confidence intervals based on clustered robust
standard errors. Horizontal axis measures time after treatment in quarters.
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The adjustment of output is shown in the second row. It is again highly similar across country
groups, in particular in the period before 2008. Output declines immediately by about 0.1 percent
and continues to decline in the following one to two years. According to the point estimate, the
maximum effect is about 0.3 percent in advanced economies and 0.2 percent in emerging economies.
After 2008 the effect is a bit weaker. It is similar on impact, but afterwards there is less of a decline.
Overall these numbers are in the same ballpark as those established by the earlier literature on the
effect of interest increases due to monetary policy shocks. In a recent paper, Coibion et al. (2017),
for instance, find that US output declines by about 0.6 percent in response to a US monetary policy
shock that raises the Fed funds rate by 100 basis points (see their Figure 2).
The fact that the output effect is more moderate after 2008 seems to be driven by the weaker
response of investment, shown in the third row of the figure. It is almost identical across country
groups both before and after 2008, but generally weaker after 2008. We show the responses of
private consumption in the bottom row of the figure. In emerging economies it is unchanged across
sample periods. In advanced economies, it is almost identical to that in emerging economies before
2008 and somewhat weaker after 2008.
We obtain additional insights into the transmission mechanism as we consider the impulse
responses of the real exchange rate and of financial variables in Figure 10. Here, the top row shows
the response of the real effective exchange rate. It declines in response to the shock, that is, the
currency depreciates in real terms in both country groups and for both sample periods. We note,
however, that the response is considerably stronger in emerging economies. The depreciation is
consistent with the notion that the spread shock reflects a capital outflow shock—for instance
because global risk aversion increases or because there is a run on the country. Consistent with this
interpretation, we find that real bank lending contracts in response to the spread shock (second row).
The effect is similar across sample periods and somewhat stronger in emerging economies than in
advanced economies—consistent with the notion that emerging economies are more vulnerable to a
reversal of international capital flows (see, for instance, Broner et al. 2013). In the third row, we
show the response of the real stock market index. It contracts strongly, but the response is again
remarkably similar across sample periods and country groups.
Recent work by Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019) shows that a contractionary US monetary
policy shock raises global risk aversion and induces a deleveraging of global financial intermediaries
such that domestic credit declines. At the same time credit spreads go up. Consistent with our
findings, their shock affecting spreads also appreciates the dollar in real terms against a basket of
currencies and triggers a sharp decline of the FTSE and the German DAX. Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2019) look more closely at monetary policy in the UK and the euro area and find that
short-term policy rates decline in response to the shock, although the response is not significant in
the UK. We show the response of monetary policy to our identified spread shock in the last row of
Figure 10 and observe rather strong differences across emerging and advanced economies. For both
sample periods we find that interest rates go up in emerging economies and, in fact, strongly so. In
advanced economies their response is very much muted. The difference across country groups may
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Figure 10: Response of exchange rate and financial variables to spread shock. See Figure 9 for
details.
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reflect a stronger dependency of emerging economies on capital flows such that monetary policy
may respond more aggressively in order to prevent large capital outflows—in line with the notion of
limited monetary policy independence in emerging economies (Rey 2013).
In Figure 11 we show the response of net exports and real fiscal variables to the spread shock. By
and large, we again find a very similar adjustment pattern across country groups and sample periods.
The top panels show the response of the trade balance-to-GDP ratio. In general, it is not very
responsive to the shock. An exception are net exports in emerging economies after 2008, where we
observe an immediate and sizable decline in response to the shock. In the second row, we show the
response of real government consumption. It is fairly unresponsive on impact, before subsequently
declining gradually, most notably in the period before 2008. To rationalize this finding, recall that
government consumption consists largely of items that are not automatically responding to the
cycle. At the same time, it takes time to adjust spending because of decision and implementation
lags (Blanchard and Perotti 2002). Our results support the idea that, at least prior to 2008, there is
a fiscal retrenchment if a country’s financing conditions deteriorate. However, this effect takes place
with a considerable delay only—in line with the evidence and arguments put forward in Born et al.
(2020)
The budget-deficit-to-GDP ratio, in turn, increases persistently and somewhat more strongly
in advanced economies, both before and after 2008 (third row). The increase of the deficit ratio
is consistent with the decline of GDP, shown in Figure 9 above. But we also find that real tax
revenues, shown in the last row of Figure 11, decline somewhat. In this case the decline is more
pronounced before 2008. After 2008 the decline is considerably weaker in both country groups.
However, the change across samples is more pronounced for emerging economies. This finding,
in turn, is consistent with the notion that fiscal policy in emerging economies has become less
pro-cyclical (Frankel et al. 2013).
Overall, we find that the transmission of spread shocks is fairly similar in advanced and emerging
economies. Output and its components contract in an almost identical manner. The same holds,
notwithstanding minor differences, for fiscal policy as well as for financial variables. An exception
is monetary policy and the exchange rate. Here, we observe a strong contraction in emerging
economies and a much weaker one in advanced economies. But throughout we find that there is
almost no change before and after 2008. This suggests that any change in the correlation pattern
documented in Section 2 reflects a change in the incidence of shocks rather than in the transmission
mechanism. We assess this issue more systematically below.
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Figure 11: Response of net exports and real fiscal variables to spread shock. See Figure 9 for
details.
24
4.2 Robustness
We also make sure that our main result is robust across a number of specifications. First, we estimate
the propensity score on the basis of a larger set of control variables, see Section 3.2 for details.19
Importantly, these variables include forecasts for GDP among others and are thus potentially
important to capture anticipation effects. Unfortunately, they are available for advanced economies
only. For these countries, the estimated impulse responses of the spread and output to a spread
shock in the extended model are very similar to the baseline results, see Figure A.6 in the appendix.
Second, we consider a more conservative treatment definition. In this case, we require either the
spread increase to be at least 50 basis points (alternative treatment definition 1) or the spread to
increase by more than two standard deviations (alternative treatment definition 2). In this case,
we obtain 196 and 113 treatments, respectively. Based on these alternative treatment definitions,
we again estimate impulse responses to a spread shock and report the responses of the spread and
output in Figures A.7 and A.8 in the appendix. They are again quite similar to the baseline.
Third, we consider alternative dates for the sample split. Rather than distinguishing the period
before and after 2008, we consider 2007 and 2009 as alternative break dates. Figures A.9 and A.10
in the appendix show the impulse responses of the spread and output to the spread shock for both
alternatives. The responses are very similar to what we obtain for the baseline.
Fourth, we drop the US and Germany from the sample because one could argue that these
countries should be considered as risk-free benchmark countries that are hardly subject to spread
shocks. Results, shown in Figure A.11 in the appendix, are again similar to the baseline.
In a last robustness test we consider an alternative framework to establish the effect of spread
shocks. As explained in Section 3.4, rather than accounting for the propensity score of a treatment
in estimating the ATE, we rely on a more conventional recursive identification scheme in the spirit of
Uribe and Yue (2006). We show results in Figure 12. To make results comparable to those shown in
Figure 9 above, we re-scale the response of the impulse responses so as to match the h = 1 response
of the spread for each sample period and country group. The organization of the figure follows
Figure 9, except that we now only report results for the spread (top row) and output (bottom row).
As before, we find that the adjustment of both variables is quite similar before and after 2008 as
well as across country groups. In addition, we note that the adjustment pattern of both variables
is quite similar to what we display in Figure 9. This is quite remarkable because the conceptual
and methodological approach that we use in both instances is quite distinct. Most importantly, we
note that the results in our baseline are based on a much larger set of control variables and on a
more narrowly defined set of shocks. In particular, in the baseline specification we only estimate
the effect of an increase in the spread, while results shown in Figure 12 are based on all shocks,
regardless of their sign. And yet, we find our key results are largely confirmed.20
19The right panel of Figure A.5 in the appendix displays the distribution of the estimated propensity scores for the
extended model, while Table A.10 reports details on a country-by-country basis.
20The response of the other variables are generally also very similar to what we obtain for the baseline. They are
available on request.
25
Before 2008 After 2008
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
S
ov
er
ei
gn
 s
pr
ea
d 
(b
ps
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
Advanced
Emerging
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
S
ov
er
ei
gn
 s
pr
ea
d 
(b
ps
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
O
ut
pu
t (
pe
rc
en
t)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
O
ut
pu
t (
pe
rc
en
t)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
Figure 12: Impulse responses to a sovereign spread shock based on the local projection in equation (7) together
with spread shocks identified using equation (6). The left panel shows results for the period before
2008 and the right panel after 2008. Solid (blue) and dashed (red) line indicate point estimates for
advanced and emerging economies, respectively. Shaded areas correspond to 90% confidence intervals
based on clustered robust standard errors computed for advanced (blue) and emerging economies (red).
All variables are expressed relative to their pre-shock level. Responses have been re-scaled to have the
same h = 1 spread response as the ATE estimator. The horizontal axis indicates quarters.
4.3 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
In Section 2 above we established a new fact: that country spreads have become much more volatile
in advanced economies after 2008 and indeed almost as volatile as in emerging economies. At the
same time, we find little evidence for a change in the transmission of spread shocks after 2008,
neither in emerging nor in advanced economies. Against this background, we ask two questions.
First, does the increase in the volatility reflect an increase in the incidence of spread shocks? Second,
and relatedly, does the increase in the volatility of spreads translate into a larger role of spread
shocks as a source of business cycle fluctuations in advanced economies?
In order to answer these questions, we compute a forecast error variance decomposition, as
detailed in Section 3.4. As always, we split the sample into advanced and emerging economies and
distinguish the period before and after 2008. In Table 3 we report the contribution of spread shocks
to the forecast error variance of the spread and output for a forecast horizon of 1 to 12 quarters.
The bottom row reports the average across those 3 years.
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Table 3: Forecast error variance decomposition
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies
Before 2008 After 2008 Before 2008 After 2008
Horizon h Spread Output Spread Output Spread Output Spread Output
1 0.45 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.42 0.00
2 0.51 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.48 0.02 0.53 0.05
3 0.50 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.50 0.07 0.55 0.11
4 0.46 0.03 0.24 0.05 0.50 0.11 0.52 0.14
5 0.46 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.50 0.14 0.46 0.16
6 0.43 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.45 0.13 0.42 0.14
7 0.41 0.06 0.26 0.10 0.42 0.14 0.42 0.13
8 0.39 0.06 0.28 0.10 0.41 0.14 0.42 0.12
9 0.34 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.40 0.14 0.40 0.11
10 0.33 0.04 0.28 0.09 0.38 0.14 0.33 0.11
11 0.31 0.04 0.28 0.09 0.36 0.14 0.28 0.10
12 0.28 0.04 0.29 0.10 0.35 0.15 0.29 0.10
∅ 0.41 0.04 0.25 0.07 0.43 0.11 0.42 0.11
Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition for the spread and output based on local projections (see Section 3.4).
In response to the first question, and focusing on the average contribution, we note that the
contribution of spread shocks to the forecast error variance of the spread itself has actually declined
in advanced economies after 2008. Before 2008 the contribution of shocks was about 40 percent and
similar to what we find for emerging economies. After 2008, it is reduced to about 25 percent. In
emerging economies there is no strong change over time.
In response to the second question, we note that before 2008 spread shocks account for only 4
percent of output variation in advanced economies and for about 11 percent in emerging economies.
The latter finding is consistent with the value of 12 percent reported by Uribe and Yue (2006).
After 2008, we find that the contribution in advanced economies has gone up to 7 percent, while
it is still 11 percent for emerging economies. Hence, while we find that the relative importance of
spread shocks for the volatility of the spread itself has declined in advanced economies after 2008,
we observe that the volatility of the spread has increased by so much in absolute terms that the
contribution of spread shocks to the volatility of output has actually gone up in advanced economies.
For this reason, we conclude that, by and large, the role of spread shocks as a source of business
cycle fluctuations has become more aligned across country groups.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we ask whether country spreads behave differently in emerging and advanced economies.
We find that this is the case before 2008, in line with the received wisdom and much of the earlier
research. However, the behavior of spreads after 2008 is no more different. We establish this
result on the basis of a large data set which contains quarterly observations for 21 advanced and
17 emerging economies since the early 1990s. Our data runs up to the end of 2018. In the first
part of the paper, we document the basic facts for the period before and after 2008. We do not
repeat these facts here, except for one: before 2008 the spread is about 10 times more volatile in
emerging economies than in advanced economies, after 2008 the volatility is basically the same in
both country groups. Other moments have converged as well and this is mostly because advanced
economies have converged towards levels common in emerging economies before 2008.
In the second part, we provide evidence on the transmission of spread shocks, again allowing for
differences across country groups and sample periods. Here, our main result is that the transmission
of spread shocks is fairly similar in advanced and emerging economies and there is also no evidence
for a significant change in the transmission mechanism after 2008. A spread shock induces a fairly
persistent increase of the spread and a contraction of economic activity. Overall the response of fiscal
policy is rather moderate. There are some spending cuts, tax revenues decline and the government
deficit increases somewhat, but there are no large differences in the adjustment mechanism across
time and country groups. We also find that the real exchange rate depreciates and that bank lending
contracts in response to the spread shock. This is consistent with the notion that the spread shock
reflects a capital outflow. The effect is considerably more pronounced in emerging economies and so
is the response of monetary policy, which raises short-term rates in response to the shock. However,
also these patterns of adjustment do not change much across sample periods.
Lastly, as we summarize our findings regarding the importance of spread shocks in accounting
for the volatility of spreads and output, we highlight a tentative policy implication. We find that
the relative importance of spread shocks for the volatility of the spread is rather low in advanced
economies after 2008, both relative to the pre-2008 period and relative to emerging economies. This
points to a relatively larger role of shocks to fundamentals and their transmission for explaining
spread movements. It also indicates that advanced economies are now more vulnerable to market
assessment regarding these fundamentals. Identifying the specific reasons for this is beyond the
scope of the present paper. But policy makers ignore this increased vulnerability at their own peril.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Description of outcome and control variables
Variable Description Source
Consumption Real private consumption Eurostat, National Sources
Credit-to-GDP Credit lending to private non-financial sector by banks BIS
at market value relative to GDP
Data available except for: Croatia, Slovenia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ecuador
Uruguay, and Peru
Debt-to-GDP General or central government outstanding debt relative to Eurostat, Worldbank
GDP. For Ecuador, El Salvador, Malaysia and Thailand: QPSD, and International
External debt stock as % of GNI (annual data interpolated Debt Statistics
to quarterly frequency). Data available except for:
Chile and Uruguay
Deficit-to-GDP Net lending or borrowing respectively relative to real GDP Eurostat, IMF Government
Finance Statistics
Floating Fixed versus floating. We rely on the coarse classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2019)
Ilzetzki et al. (2019) where codes 1 and 2 are classified
as a peg, while 3 to 6 are classified as floating
Real effective FX rate Log effective real exchange rate; an increase indicates an appreciation BIS, complemented by
of the economy’s currency against a broad basket of currencies Darvas (2012)
G Government spending is exhaustive real government spending Eurostat, National sources
G growth First log difference of real government spending G.
G growth forecast Expected government spending growth at time t Oxford Economics
List of available countries, see GDP growth forecast
GDP Real GDP Eurostat, National sources
GDP growth First log difference of real GDP
GDP growth forecast Expected GDP growth at time t. Data available for: Oxford Economics
Austria, Czech Republic Denmark, Finland, France, UK
US, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand
IMF assistance Dummy variable which equals 1 if a country has a Standby Monitoring of Fund
Arrangement (with or without Supplemental Reserve Facility) Arrangements
or an Extended Fund Facility and 0 otherwise. (MONA) database
Inflation Inflation based on GDP Deflator Eurostat, National sources
Investment Real Investment Eurostat, National Sources
Interest Rate Policy or short term interest rate IMF, OECD
NFA Net financial assets Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
NX share Net export share of GDP Eurostat, National sources
Political risk Total political risk index from International Country PRS Group
Risk Guide (ICRG) ranging between 0 (low risk) and 100
(high risk). Composed of 12 subcomponents covering
different aspects of political risk
Political stability Government stability index from ICRG PRS Group
ranging from 0 (low risk) to 12 (high risk).
Subcomponent of political risk, see above
Political turnover Dummy variable indicating an ideological leadership change: Archigos Database
1 if new incumbent reaches office with of Political Leadership,
different political orientation, 0 else own classifications
Real bank lending Credit-to-GDP multiplied by real GDP. For more information,
see description and data sources for Credit-to-GDP and GDP
Stock Market Index Real log stock market index detrended Datastream (Thomson Reuters)
Tax revenue Log linearly detrended real total government revenues Eurostat, IMF World Revenue
Longitudinal Dataset (WoRLD)
Tax-to-GDP Total government revenues Eurostat, IMF World Revenue
relative to real GDP, linearly detrended Longitudinal Dataset
(WoRLD)
Term spread 10–year term spread, difference between Datastream
bond market and money market rate. Data available except (Thomson Reuters)
for: Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Turkey, Argentina, Chile
Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, El Salvador, Uruguay, Peru
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of the country spread with an alternative break date in
2007Q1
Before 2007 After 2007 Before 2007 After 2007
Adv. Em. Adv. Em. Adv. Em. Adv. Em.
Spread level sit (percentage points) Spread change ∆sit (basis points)
Mean 0.35 4.52 1.40 2.98 −0.74 −4.76 2.89 3.21
Median 0.26 3.16 0.61 2.30 −0.74 −12.88 −0.45 −3.00
Sd 0.33 4.02 2.15 2.26 12.22 167.80 66.84 95.49
Min −0.14 0.19 −0.06 0.15 −99.08 −952.59 −314.45 −854.70
Max 2.20 24.22 24.56 19.50 82.89 1 039.00 783.21 795.84
Kurtosis 10.54 6.03 28.13 11.66 20.06 11.83 32.10 21.90
Skewness 2.28 1.65 4.06 2.45 −0.64 1.12 2.75 0.89
Observations 792 651 966 805 767 630 961 803
Notes: Level of spread measured in percentage points (left panel) and quarterly change in basis points (right
panel).
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of the country spread with an alternative break date in
2009Q1
Before 2009 After 2009 Before 2009 After 2009
Adv. Em. Adv. Em. Adv. Em. Adv. Em.
Spread level sit (percentage points) Spread change ∆sit (basis points)
Mean 0.39 4.21 1.56 3.02 3.57 6.70 −1.38 −8.31
Median 0.26 2.86 0.72 2.36 0.10 −3.00 −1.83 −8.83
Sd 0.50 3.85 2.29 2.23 27.92 162.48 67.76 84.80
Min −0.14 0.15 −0.06 0.41 −99.08 −952.59 −314.45 −854.70
Max 8.17 24.22 24.56 19.50 477.30 1 039.00 783.21 628.69
Kurtosis 85.83 6.71 25.31 11.26 128.75 11.91 32.78 24.59
Skewness 6.79 1.79 3.83 2.44 8.80 1.13 2.63 −0.54
Observations 954 786 804 670 926 765 802 668
Notes: Level of spread measured in percentage points (left panel) and quarterly change in basis points (right
panel).
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for spread changes (end of quarter) measured in basis points.
Before 2008 After 2008
Country Group First obs Last obs Obs min(∆si) max(∆si) min(∆si) max(∆si)
Australia A 2003q2 2010q3 25 −14 11 −73 90
Austria A 1994q1 2018q4 100 −15 20 −62 85
Belgium A 1992q1 2018q4 108 −35 17 −87 104
Czech Republic A 2004q2 2018q4 59 −4 11 −98 109
Denmark A 1988q4 2018q4 111 −99 83 −58 98
Finland A 1992q3 2018q4 106 −30 41 −47 73
France A 1999q2 2018q4 79 −12 12 −54 60
Germany A 2004q2 2018q4 59 −4 4 −30 47
Greece A 1992q3 2018q4 101 −40 50 −254 783
Ireland A 1992q1 2018q4 108 −25 18 −280 205
Italy A 1989q2 2018q4 119 −20 32 −204 238
Latvia A 2006q2 2018q4 51 −7 98 −314 477
Lithuania A 2005q3 2018q4 54 −24 57 −240 375
Netherlands A 1999q2 2018q4 79 −8 11 −40 59
Portugal A 1993q3 2018q4 102 −14 14 −215 307
Slovakia A 2004q2 2018q4 59 −7 9 −205 116
Slovenia A 2003q2 2018q4 63 −51 31 −183 178
Spain A 1992q4 2018q4 105 −55 22 −75 144
Sweden A 1993q2 2018q4 92 −83 51 −35 102
United Kingdom A 1993q1 2018q4 104 −41 25 −47 81
United States A 2008q1 2018q4 44 −23 61
Argentina E 1994Q1 2018q4 75 −291 565 −855 796
Brazil E 1994q3 2018q4 98 −953 852 −165 184
Bulgaria E 1994q4 2018q4 97 −594 468 −211 417
Chile E 1999q3 2018q4 78 −55 89 −148 165
Colombia E 1997q2 2018q4 87 −433 560 −208 225
Croatia E 2004q2 2018q4 59 −24 38 −174 310
Ecuador E 1995q2 2018q4 85 −519 1 039 −317 629
El Salvador E 2002q3 2018q4 66 −67 90 −201 515
Hungary E 1999q2 2018q4 79 −67 63 −190 375
Malaysia E 1997q1 2018q4 88 −439 622 −200 221
Mexico E 1994q1 2018q4 100 −611 726 −185 204
Peru E 1997q2 2018q4 85 −299 368 −176 244
Poland E 1995q1 2018q4 96 −349 224 −124 190
South Africa E 1995q1 2018q4 96 −175 300 −157 243
Thailand E 1997q3 2018q4 86 −253 225 −123 86
Turkey E 1996q3 2018q4 90 −322 382 −212 188
Uruguay E 2001q3 2018q4 68 −415 774 −276 318
Notes: “A” denotes advanced economies, while “E” denotes emerging economies following the classification in IMF
(2015). US observations before 2008 are missing since CDS data is not available.
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Table A.5: Standard deviation of spreads and spread changes in advanced and emerging economies
before 2008 and after 2008
Before 2008 After 2008 Before 2008 After 2008
σ(sit) σ(∆sit) σ(sit) σ(∆sit) σ(sit) σ(∆sit) σ(sit) σ(∆sit)
Advanced economies Emerging economies
Australia 0.097 6.605 0.370 41.702 Argentina 3.282 191.484 3.552 260.232
Austria 0.090 6.212 0.407 26.131 Brazil 4.267 286.385 0.899 66.925
Belgium 0.177 7.432 0.607 32.969 Bulgaria 5.301 169.717 1.420 96.427
Czech Republic 0.044 3.651 0.411 30.455 Chile 0.562 30.648 0.534 44.754
Denmark 0.474 24.684 0.347 25.016 Colombia 2.258 164.523 0.853 63.747
Finland 0.209 9.766 0.268 19.765 Croatia 0.206 16.186 1.149 84.340
France 0.053 5.182 0.371 23.541 Ecuador 4.757 274.815 2.198 186.510
Germany 0.017 1.925 0.163 12.253 El Salvador 0.790 40.092 1.254 113.369
Greece 0.571 15.895 4.916 200.478 Hungary 0.377 25.733 1.487 97.193
Ireland 0.221 7.166 2.268 87.394 Malaysia 1.714 130.962 0.667 61.203
Italy 0.279 9.684 1.143 66.244 Mexico 2.886 172.559 0.716 57.482
Latvia 0.450 35.931 2.101 112.558 Peru 2.021 124.781 0.811 63.468
Lithuania 0.228 28.935 1.732 100.568 Poland 1.640 78.104 0.793 56.406
Netherlands 0.069 5.023 0.275 18.647 South Africa 1.323 68.257 0.862 69.835
Portugal 0.105 6.273 2.855 102.097 Thailand 1.109 73.002 0.483 35.729
Slovakia 0.040 4.048 1.021 58.982 Turkey 2.697 154.774 0.864 68.489
Slovenia 0.157 19.205 1.522 70.285 Uruguay 3.838 215.049 1.186 83.917
Spain 0.196 10.085 1.248 50.283
Sweden 0.223 18.506 0.250 19.955
United Kingdom 0.205 11.223 0.279 18.979
United States 0.113 11.604
Mean 0.321 12.770 2.215 69.485 Average 3.938 160.067 2.291 98.868
Notes: Spreads are measured in percentage points and spread changes in basis points.
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Table A.6: Number of treatments and share of treatments in total number of spread changes by
country (excluding default episodes)
Country ∑Di (>25bp) % of nobs ∑Di(>50bp) % of nobs ∑Di(>2σ) % of nobs
Argentina 9 12.00 9 12.00 2 2.67
Australia 1 4.00 1 4.00 1 4.00
Austria 4 4.00 2 2.00 3 3.00
Belgium 8 7.41 2 1.85 3 2.78
Brazil 6 6.12 6 6.12 4 4.08
Bulgaria 8 8.25 8 8.25 3 3.09
Chile 10 12.82 6 7.69 3 3.85
Colombia 6 6.90 6 6.90 2 2.30
Croatia 4 6.78 4 6.78 2 3.39
Czech Republic 6 10.17 2 3.39 2 3.39
Denmark 6 5.41 4 3.60 4 3.60
Ecuador 8 9.41 8 9.41 3 3.53
El Salvador 6 9.09 6 9.09 2 3.03
Finland 3 2.83 2 1.89 3 2.83
France 4 5.06 2 2.53 3 3.80
Germany 2 3.39 0 0.00 2 3.39
Greece 9 8.91 9 8.91 5 4.95
Hungary 6 7.59 6 7.59 3 3.80
Ireland 8 7.41 8 7.41 5 4.63
Italy 8 6.72 6 5.04 5 4.20
Latvia 4 7.84 4 7.84 1 1.96
Lithuania 6 11.11 6 11.11 2 3.70
Malaysia 5 5.68 5 5.68 2 2.27
Mexico 5 5.00 5 5.00 3 3.00
Netherlands 2 2.53 1 1.27 2 2.53
Peru 7 8.24 7 8.24 4 4.71
Poland 6 6.25 6 6.25 4 4.17
Portugal 7 6.86 7 6.86 4 3.92
Slovakia 7 11.86 7 11.86 3 5.08
Slovenia 6 9.52 6 9.52 2 3.17
South Africa 10 10.42 10 10.42 3 3.13
Spain 8 7.62 7 6.67 6 5.71
Sweden 6 6.52 2 2.17 3 3.26
Thailand 7 8.14 7 8.14 3 3.49
Turkey 12 13.33 12 13.33 4 4.44
United Kingdom 3 2.88 1 0.96 3 2.88
United States 1 2.27 1 2.27 1 2.27
Uruguay 5 7.35 5 7.35 3 4.41
Total 229 mean: 7.24 196 mean: 6.20 113 mean: 3.57
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Table A.7: Quarters t with treatment D in country i
Quarter t Countries with Dt = 1 according to Equation (1)
1989Q2 Denmark
1994Q1 Argentina, Mexico
1994Q4 Argentina, Bulgaria, Mexico
1995Q1 Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, Poland, South Africa
1997Q3 South Africa, Thailand
1997Q4 Bulgaria, Denmark, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
1998Q2 Brazil, Bulgaria, Malaysia, Peru, Thailand, Turkey
1998Q3 Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
1999Q1 Ecuador
1999Q2 Colombia
2000Q1 Chile, Colombia, Sweden
2000Q2 Chile, Colombia
2000Q4 South Africa, Turkey
2001Q1 Turkey
2001Q3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Poland, Turkey
2001Q4 Denmark
2002Q1 Uruguay
2002Q2 Chile, Brazil, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay
2002Q3 Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay
2003Q1 Turkey
2004Q2 Ecuador, Turkey
2005Q3 Sweden
2005Q4 Denmark, Sweden
2006Q4 Ecuador
2007Q2 Sweden
2007Q3 Chile
2008Q1 Belgium, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Lithuania, Hungary, South Africa
2008Q3 Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Latvia,
Lithuania, Peru, Slovakia, South Africa
2008Q4 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay
2009Q1 Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal
2009Q4 Greece, United Kingdom
2010Q2 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain
2010Q3 Ireland
2010Q4 Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Spain
2011Q1 Ireland, Portugal
2011Q2 Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
2011Q3 Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malaysia, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay
2011Q4 Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia
2012Q2 Croatia, Italy, Slovenia, Spain
2013Q1 Argentina, Hungary, Slovenia
2013Q3 Slovakia
2014Q2 Slovakia
2014Q4 Ecuador, Greece
2015Q1 Greece
2015Q2 Italy, Spain
2015Q3 Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Malaysia, South Africa, Thailand
2016Q1 Portugal
2018Q2 Italy, Spain
2018Q4 Chile
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Table A.8: Logit model: coefficients and average marginal effects (AME) based on Equation (2)
Dependent Variable: Baseline model Extended model
Treatment Dt coeff AME coeff AME
Debt-to-GDPt 17.5430* 0.9855* 115.1179*** 4.1949***
(8.5996) (0.4838) (28.2418) (1.0035)
Debt-to-GDP2t -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0054*** -0.0002***
(0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0001)
GDP growtht -37.7084*** -2.1183*** -71.8303** -2.6175**
(9.2445) (0.5167) (26.8157) (0.9629)
G growtht -1.1192 -0.0629 -15.6519 -0.5704
(5.5443) (0.3115) (14.1591) (0.5164)
Tax-to-GDPt 0.0121 0.0007 -0.1296 -0.0047
(0.0949) (0.0053) (0.1898) (0.0069)
Deficit-to-GDPt 10.5446 0.5924 -50.4703 -1.8391
(14.5264) (0.8161) (36.0059) (1.3067)
NFAt 2.6319 0.1479 -0.9824 -0.0358
(2.6718) (0.1502) (5.0811) (0.1851)
NX sharet -7.4250 -0.4171 -8.8244 -0.3216
(6.6155) (0.3720) (18.5801) (0.6766)
Inflationt -22.5318** -1.2658** -93.6485** -3.4126**
(8.1768) (0.4595) (32.0344) (1.1592)
FX ratet -16.7344*** -0.9401*** -24.8502** -0.9055**
(3.0005) (0.1672) (8.1644) (0.2897)
Stock markett -1.3734 -0.1564** 22.2501** -0.1015
(1.2316) (0.0532) (6.9120) (0.0842)
Political riskt -0.4118** -0.0231** -0.0242 -0.0009
(0.1417) (0.0079) (0.3366) (0.0123)
Government stabilityt 0.4520 0.0254 -0.2159 -0.0079
(0.2380) (0.0134) (0.4999) (0.0182)
IMF assistancet 0.8033 0.0451 0.6599 0.0240
(0.4130) (0.0232) (1.7848) (0.0650)
Floatingt -1.5424** -0.0866** -4.3400** -0.1582**
(0.4883) (0.0275) (1.4333) (0.0513)
Political turnovert 0.1875 0.0105 -0.0145 -0.0005
(0.4957) (0.0278) (1.0258) (0.0374)
Debt-to-GDPt−1 -20.8251* -1.1699* -91.1007*** -3.3197***
(8.3335) (0.4687) (25.6742) (0.9160)
Debt-to-GDP2t−1 0.0008 0.0000 0.0046*** 0.0002***
(0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0000)
GDP growtht−1 17.8767* 1.0043* -18.4398 -0.6719
(8.1544) (0.4579) (31.4582) (1.1450)
G growtht−1 -10.8099 -0.6073 -40.1146* -1.4618*
(6.3303) (0.3562) (16.7281) (0.6058)
Tax-to-GDPt−1 -0.0077 -0.0004 0.0177 0.0006
(0.0952) (0.0053) (0.1951) (0.0071)
Deficit-to-GDPt−1 15.1266 0.8498 64.9080 2.3653
(15.0660) (0.8462) (40.3421) (1.4655)
NFAt−1A -3.4585 -0.1943 2.8335 0.1033
(2.6466) (0.1488) (5.2296) (0.1903)
NX sharet−1 -1.5166 -0.0852 -6.8379 -0.2492
(6.7019) (0.3765) (19.2400) (0.7012)
Inflationt−1 11.7221 0.6585 -19.7957 -0.7214
(8.3943) (0.4709) (31.0485) (1.1299)
FX ratet−1 14.8142*** 0.8322*** 28.5589*** 1.0407***
(2.9757) (0.1656) (8.5966) (0.3043)
Stock markett−1 1.6735 0.0940 6.0567 0.2207
(1.3278) (0.0746) (3.4333) (0.1249)
∆st−1 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0074 -0.0003
(0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0054) (0.0002)
Political riskt−1 0.5283*** 0.0297*** 0.3930 0.0143
(0.1437) (0.0080) (0.3094) (0.0112)
Government stabilityt−1 -0.8565*** -0.0481*** -0.8497 -0.0310
(0.2406) (0.0135) (0.4597) (0.0165)
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Table A.8: Logit model estimation results according to Equation (2) – continued
Dependent Variable: Baseline model Extended model
Treatment Dt coeff AME coeff AME
Stock market2t -0.1097 -1.8278***
(0.0587) (0.4605)
Dt−1 × Stock markett -0.1332 0.2359
(0.0762) (0.4008)
GDP growtht−2 7.1439 0.4013 60.4079* 2.2013*
(8.3100) (0.4664) (26.4611) (0.9593)
G growtht−2 -13.8706* -0.7792* 0.6169 0.0225
(6.3529) (0.3572) (18.8570) (0.6872)
G growtht−3 -7.4643 -0.4193 25.5322 0.9304
(6.2228) (0.3499) (18.5595) (0.6740)
G growtht−4 -12.8755* -0.7233* -18.6650 -0.6802
(5.4041) (0.3042) (15.4221) (0.5619)
Stock markett−2 1.0253 0.0576 -2.7126 -0.0988
(1.2592) (0.0708) (3.1649) (0.1153)
Stock markett−3 2.7250* 0.1531* 6.4923* 0.2366*
(1.2150) (0.0683) (3.1547) (0.1141)
Stock markett−4 -2.5033** -0.1406** -7.2327** -0.2636**
(0.8613) (0.0485) (2.3299) (0.0839)
Dt−1 0.5435 0.0305 -3.4780 -0.1267
(0.5790) (0.0325) (2.7397) (0.0996)
Dt−2 -0.1948 -0.0109 -0.2511 -0.0092
(0.3440) (0.0193) (0.7783) (0.0283)
Dt−3 0.3609 0.0203 -1.6442 -0.0599
(0.3350) (0.0188) (0.8572) (0.0312)
Dt−4 0.1982 0.0111 0.0299 0.0011
(0.3567) (0.0200) (0.7408) (0.0270)
Dt−1(neg) -0.0525 -0.0030 -0.5953 -0.0217
(0.4155) (0.0233) (1.0288) (0.0375)
Dt−2(neg) -0.5162 -0.0290 -1.2669 -0.0462
(0.4002) (0.0225) (0.9004) (0.0327)
Interest Ratet 0.1166 0.0042
(0.6530) (0.0238)
Credit-to-GDPt 17.5733 0.6404
(13.5510) (0.4941)
Term spreadt 1.1042* 0.0402*
(0.4792) (0.0173)
GDP growth forecastt -322.8091*** -11.7632***
(92.7298) (3.3317)
G growth forecastt 102.0260 3.7178
(52.6013) (1.9093)
Interest Ratet−1 0.9404 0.0343
(0.6814) (0.0248)
Credit-to-GDPt−1 -13.5219 -0.4927
(13.1559) (0.4797)
Term spreadt−1 -0.3922 -0.0143
(0.4325) (0.0157)
GDP growth forecastt−1 231.9433*** 8.4521***
(66.3761) (2.3742)
G growth forecastt−1 -157.1149*** -5.7253***
(46.7019) (1.6768)
Observations 1965 1965 1003 1003
AUC 0.8730 0.9457
std(AUC) 0.0139 0.0155
Notes: Dependent variable is treatment according to Equation (1). Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Constant and country-fixed effects included but not reported. Some country-fixed effects are dropped in estimation due
to perfect collinearity. For interaction terms, marginal effects cannot be computed. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.9: Descriptive statistics of the estimated propensity score by country for the baseline
model specification
Country Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Obs.
Argentina 0.136 0.167 0.080 0.002 0.811 59
Australia 0.040 0.121 0.010 0.001 0.612 25
Austria 0.060 0.057 0.047 0.003 0.302 67
Belgium 0.107 0.092 0.076 0.003 0.510 75
Brazil 0.074 0.172 0.012 0.001 0.827 68
Bulgaria 0.077 0.091 0.029 0.003 0.323 39
Colombia 0.038 0.065 0.016 0.000 0.370 52
Croatia 0.092 0.106 0.055 0.004 0.535 45
Czech Republic 0.111 0.144 0.057 0.002 0.709 54
Denmark 0.070 0.092 0.046 0.004 0.622 57
Finland 0.028 0.046 0.013 0.001 0.321 71
France 0.061 0.061 0.038 0.004 0.320 71
Germany 0.037 0.042 0.017 0.005 0.189 54
Greece 0.143 0.229 0.023 0.001 0.910 63
Hungary 0.083 0.151 0.028 0.002 0.800 74
Ireland 0.127 0.248 0.007 0.000 0.993 63
Italy 0.088 0.077 0.065 0.008 0.474 75
Lithuania 0.122 0.193 0.034 0.007 0.976 49
Malaysia 0.038 0.098 0.016 0.000 0.696 52
Mexico 0.053 0.143 0.017 0.000 0.998 76
Netherlands 0.028 0.043 0.013 0.002 0.272 72
Peru 0.098 0.145 0.051 0.002 0.670 51
Poland 0.021 0.025 0.010 0.002 0.116 51
Portugal 0.097 0.124 0.036 0.008 0.568 72
Slovakia 0.163 0.164 0.124 0.026 0.931 43
Slovenia 0.103 0.135 0.035 0.004 0.565 58
South Africa 0.089 0.132 0.026 0.002 0.687 56
Spain 0.101 0.155 0.035 0.002 0.778 87
Sweden 0.078 0.090 0.045 0.004 0.489 77
Thailand 0.076 0.191 0.014 0.000 0.987 66
Turkey 0.161 0.232 0.049 0.001 0.833 56
United Kingdom 0.048 0.085 0.024 0.004 0.645 63
United States 0.042 0.025 0.039 0.012 0.104 24
Total 0.082 0.138 0.032 0.000 0.998 1965
Notes: Baseline specification includes a smaller set of control variables. Total indicates the equally-weighted country
average/sum. Values have been rounded to 3 decimal places and are bounded away from zero in all instances.
Robustness of the results to truncating the propensity score has been verified.
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Table A.10: Descriptive statistics of the estimated propensity score by country for the extended
model specification
Country Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max Obs.
Australia 0.040 0.126 0.001 0.000 0.602 25
Austria 0.063 0.140 0.013 0.000 0.938 63
Czech Republic 0.111 0.180 0.024 0.000 0.704 54
Denmark 0.073 0.173 0.007 0.000 0.998 55
Finland 0.029 0.088 0.003 0.000 0.573 69
France 0.055 0.130 0.008 0.000 0.653 67
Germany 0.038 0.083 0.003 0.000 0.432 52
Greece 0.164 0.303 0.005 0.000 0.998 55
Ireland 0.148 0.315 0.001 0.000 1.000 54
Italy 0.106 0.197 0.023 0.000 0.835 73
Malaysia 0.051 0.173 0.000 0.000 1.000 39
Netherlands 0.029 0.099 0.002 0.000 0.778 70
Portugal 0.103 0.234 0.002 0.000 0.978 68
Spain 0.083 0.192 0.007 0.000 0.825 80
Sweden 0.106 0.198 0.019 0.000 0.877 47
Thailand 0.038 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.609 52
United Kingdom 0.054 0.149 0.006 0.000 0.986 56
United States 0.042 0.072 0.018 0.000 0.316 24
Total 0.076 0.183 0.005 0.000 1.000 1003
Notes: Total indicates the equally-weighted country average/sum. Values have been rounded to 3 decimal places and
are bounded away from zero and one in all instances. Robustness of the results to truncating the propensity score has
been verified.
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Figure A.1: Cross-correlation functions for output yt and spread st+k, measured in levels at
lead/lag k = 0, . . . ,±4 with alternative break date 2007Q1. For details, see Figure (3)
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Figure A.2: Cross-correlation functions for output yt and spread st+k, measured in levels at
lead/lag k = 0, . . . ,±4 with alternative break date 2009Q1. For details, see Figure (3)
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Figure A.3: Event windows country-by-country for the full sample: Treatment in period t = 0 and
the average spread (in pps) in period t±h. Country-specific spread movements around
treatments are measured as the average of spread deviations from the respective
country mean over all events in the country in the event window t ± h. Time is
measured in quarters. Treatment is defined according to Equation (1).
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Figure A.4: Event windows country-by-country for the full sample: Treatment in period t = 0 and
the average spread (in pps) in period t±h. Country-specific spread movements around
treatments are measured as the average of spread deviations from the respective
country mean over all events in the country in the event window t ± h. Time is
measured in quarters. Treatment is defined according to Equation (1).
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Figure A.5: Distribution of propensity score for the baseline model (left panel) and the extended
model (right panel): Kernel density estimate of the predicted probabilities for treat-
ment (solid line) and control group (dashed line) based on an Epanechnikov kernel
with bandwidth 0.025.
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Robustness check: Extended model specification
Before 2008 After 2008
-4
0
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
S
ov
er
ei
gn
 s
pr
ea
d 
(b
ps
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-4
0
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
S
ov
er
ei
gn
 s
pr
ea
d 
(b
ps
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
O
ut
pu
t (
pe
rc
en
t)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
O
ut
pu
t (
pe
rc
en
t)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
Figure A.6: ATE: responses to a sovereign spread shock (spread increase by more than one standard deviation
but at least 25 bp). Extended specification of the first stage and regression adjustment. Response for
advanced economies only due to data limitations. For details, see Figure 9.
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Robustness check: Conservative treatment definition
Before 2008 After 2008
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Figure A.7: Impulse responses to a h = 0 sovereign spread shock based on the ATE estimator in equation (5)
together with a conservative treatment definition of Di,t = 1(∆si,t >= σi ∧ ∆si,t >= 50bp), i.e.
increases of at least 50bp. For details, see Figure 9.
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Figure A.8: Impulse responses to a h = 0 sovereign spread shock based on the ATE estimator in equation (5)
together with a conservative treatment definition of Di,t = 1(∆si,t >= 2σi ∧∆si,t >= 25bp), i.e.
increases of at least 2 standard deviations. For details, see Figure 9
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Robustness check: Sample split in 2007
Before 2007 After 2007
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Figure A.9: Impulse responses to a h = 0 sovereign spread shock based on the ATE estimator in equation (5)
together with the treatment definition in (1) and an alternative break date of 2007Q1. For details,
see Figure 9.
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Robustness check: Sample split in 2009
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-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
 S
ov
er
ei
gn
 s
pr
ea
d 
(b
ps
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
Advanced
Emerging
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
 S
ov
er
ei
gn
 s
pr
ea
d 
(b
ps
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
O
ut
pu
t (
pe
rc
en
t)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
O
ut
pu
t (
pe
rc
en
t)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarter
Figure A.10: Impulse responses to a h = 0 sovereign spread shock based on the ATE estimator in equation (5)
together with the treatment definition in (1) and an alternative break date in 2009Q1. For details,
see Figure 9.
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Robustness check: Excluding Germany and US
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Figure A.11: Impulse responses to a h = 0 sovereign spread shock based on the ATE estimator in equation (5)
together with the treatment definition in (1) when excluding Germany and the United States. For
details, see Figure 9.
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